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Abstract: 
The institutions of Scottish devolution were designed using the majoritarian Westminster 
system as a “negative template” with the hope that a more consensual “new politics” would 
emerge. The electoral system successfully prevented a single-party majority in the first three 
sessions of the Scottish Parliament. But did this bring about the desired changes in party 
behaviour? Research on the connection between campaign promises and government actions 
shows that it is strongest in the United Kingdom - where single-party majorities are the norm 
- and weakest in countries where multiparty coalitions are common. If new politics had 
succeeded in its aims, we would expect Scottish governments to fulfil a lower proportion of 
manifesto pledges than British governments. This study investigates the extent to which the 
1999 and 2003 Scottish Labour-Liberal Democrat coalitions and the 2007 SNP minority 
administration fulfilled their campaign pledges using an original dataset containing 600 
individual manifesto pledges. All three parties are found to have fulfilled pledges at a rate 
comparable to Westminster governments. These findings reinforce the notion that the reality 
of post-devolution Scottish politics fell short of its designers’ ambitions. Supplementary 
analyses provide further support for inferences made in previous pledge studies concerning 
the factors which contribute to pledge fulfilment. 
Keywords: manifestos, election pledges, party responsibility, devolution, Scottish politics, 
Westminster system 
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Introduction 
Scotland’s first national legislature for nearly 300 years was elected in 1999, the result of a 
1997 referendum in which the country’s voters overwhelmingly endorsed the devolution of 
limited powers from the United Kingdom central government to create a “quasi-federal” set 
of institutions (Cairney 2011). Until this time, Scotland was “the only democratic country in 
the world to have its own system of law, but no elected legislature of its own to determine 
or reform that law” (Arter 2004, p. 2). The architects of devolution, the Scottish 
Constitutional Convention (SCC) and its successor the Consultative Steering Group (CSG), 
designed Scotland’s new institutions in response to what they perceived to be endemic 
shortcomings of the majoritarian Westminster system (Cairney 2011, p. 9). The mixed-
member proportional (MMP) electoral system, the centrepiece of this effort, initially lived 
up to expectations by preventing any party from winning a parliamentary majority at the 
first three times of asking. 
Shortly after Parliament was reinstated in 1999, however, doubts were expressed about the 
extent to which political reality at Holyrood matched the substantive aspirations of the new 
politics (see Mitchell 2000, p. 620). Did the institutional design bring about the desired 
changes in political culture north of the border during this period? The existing evidence is 
mixed. But until now attention has not been devoted to the party mandate, which lies at the 
heart of democratic theory (APSA 1950; Downs 1957). The existing literature on manifesto 
pledges shows that governing parties tend to carry out most of their campaign promises. 
This “programme-to-policy linkage”, however, is much stronger in majoritarian democracies 
like the United Kingdom than multiparty consensus systems (Thomson et al. 2017). Had the 
aims of the SCC/CSG been achieved in the early years of Scottish devolution, the 
programme-to-policy linkage observed at Holyrood ought to be weaker than the one at 
Westminster. 
This article tests the extent to which the first three Scottish governments between 1999 and 
2011 carried out their manifesto pledges. In addition to its contribution to the literature on 
the early years of Scottish devolution, this study aims to expand on existing pledge 
fulfilment research by testing the programme-to-policy linkage under different institutional 
arrangements and levels of governance. The findings of the study are broadly in line with 
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existing literature on both the programme-to-policy linkage and Scottish devolution, 
demonstrating high rates of pledge fulfilment and, consequently, limited divergence from 
Westminster norms. 
 
The political context: devolution and “new politics” 
Following the successful devolution referendum, the Scotland Act 1998 made explicit the 
powers to be retained by the UK government. The “reserved” areas were security and 
foreign affairs, macroeconomic policy, social welfare and a handful of other competencies 
(Keating 2005). Devolution therefore handed wide-ranging responsibilities to the new 
legislature. These included healthcare provision, agriculture, criminal justice, transport 
infrastructure, local government and education, as well as limited tax-varying powers in 
accordance with a supplementary referendum ballot proposal which had also been 
approved (Keating 2005). Some important institutions of Scottish public life—such as the 
Church of Scotland and Scots Law—had always been distinct, conferring a degree of so-
called “administrative devolution” on the country (Cairney 2011). Political devolution 
therefore gave rise to a highly unusual scenario. An existing Westminster party system, 
which had taken on an increasingly Scottish flavour since the 1970s (Keating 2005), was 
“imported” into a new set of institutions which were created to serve a nation with its own 
long-distinct cultural, social, legal and political context (Arter 2004). 
While lobbying for devolution through the 1990s, the Scottish Constitutional Convention 
stated that a Scottish political system ought to engender a form of politics “radically 
different from the rituals of Westminster: more participative, more creative, less needlessly 
confrontational” (quoted in McGarvey and Cairney 2008, p. 12). This statement 
encapsulates the lofty aims of the SCC and, after the referendum, the cross-party 
Consultative Steering Group set up to oversee the implementation of the result. These 
“architects of devolution” sought to introduce “new institutions, new processes and a new 
political culture” (Mitchell 2000, p. 1). They viewed Westminster politics and the UK more 
generally as a “negative template” (ibid, p. 2), and looked to Scandinavian-style consensus 
democracy as an alternate ideal (Cairney 2011, p. 10). This was premised on a conception of 
Westminster as a system which: 
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…exaggerates government majorities, excludes small parties, concentrates power 
within government rather than Parliament and its committees, and encourages 
adversarialism between government and opposition (Cairney 2011, p. 11). 
The centrepiece of Scotland’s new politics was the electoral system (Lundberg 2014). The 
Additional Member System (known to academics as Mixed-Member Proportional, or MMP) 
had been identified by the SCC as a compromise between the local emphasis of 
parliamentary elections at the UK level and a recognition of the representative distortions 
produced by First Past the Post (Mitchell 2000, pp. 607, 608). The electoral system was an 
immediate success from the perspective of its designers, producing successive Labour-
Liberal Democrat coalition governments. Although a single-party majority was achieved by 
the SNP in 2011, the party narrowly lost it again in 2016, forcing its representatives to 
informally collaborate with the small contingent of Scottish Green MSPs for a majority on 
key votes. 
In addition to MMP, other measures taken in the attempt to induce consensual politics 
included an emphasis on powerful parliamentary committees over plenary sessions (Arter 
2004, p. 5) and the lowering of barriers to interest group and citizen participation, such as 
the right to petition parliament—accompanied by a dedicated committee (ibid, p. 8)—and a 
“Civic Forum” to engage voters across the country in the policy making process (Mitchell 
2000, pp. 611, 612). 
The political elites in charge of shaping devolution put faith in the ability of these 
institutions to limit the Westminster model’s influence on the incipient Scottish executive 
and legislative culture. Their success in practice is a matter of debate. The failure of the 
SCC/CSG to anticipate executive dominance has drawn criticism, as well as its inability to 
recognise the argumentative, ideological character of political parties (Mitchell 2000, pp. 
620, 621; McGarvey and Cairney 2008, p. 225; Keating 2005, p. 217). According to Mitchell, 
the SCC was mistaken to assume that the electoral system alone would bring about the 
desired changes. The system also produced unforeseen challenges which exacerbated 
partisan tensions, most notably the much-studied territorial disputes between constituency 
and regional MSPs (e.g. Carman and Shephard 2007; Lundberg 2014). But these pessimistic 
outcomes and judgements may overlook latent shifts in the direction envisaged. 
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With devolution, the Westminster party system was placed in a new institutional context 
designed to remake its longstanding traditions. Did the new Scottish institutions bring about 
the desired changes in party behaviour and executive and legislative culture? This question 
can be tested, in part, by examining the strength of the party mandate in Scotland in the 
years following devolution. 
 
Mandate theory 
In his seminal volume An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs (1957) conceived of 
parties and voters as self-interested rational actors. He expected parties to behave 
“responsibly”, carrying out their campaign pledges as mandated by voters. The idea of party 
responsibility satisfies the core normative demand of democracy that voters be given a 
meaningful choice between consequential alternatives (Schedler 1998). Though Downs’ 
original theory has received substantial elaboration and criticism in the decades since its 
publication, researchers still recognise the electoral mandate as a form of representation 
(Andeweg and Thomassen 2005; Mansbridge 2003; Pitkin 1967). The idea of the mandate is 
a “common sense” (Körösényi and Sebők 2018) conceptual starting point for the simple 
empirical question of whether political parties do as they had promised. In real life, parties 
persist in issuing manifestos even though few voters consult the documents first-hand 
(Harmel 2018, p. 229) and representatives perceive electoral mandates (Grossback et al. 
2005). As Sartori stated (1976, p. 16), democracy in practice is messy, “determined by a 
concurrence of events” rather than neat academic concepts. 
Though the responsible parties model is strongly linked to majoritarian systems in general 
and Westminster in particular (Royed 1996), the dynamics are expected to function in a 
similar way in multiparty democracies, albeit with a “less effective transmission of voters’ 
policy preferences into government actions” (Thomson 2001, p. 173). This hypothesis has 
been confirmed repeatedly, with the linkage found to be weaker under coalition 
governments, in which power is shared among multiple parties (Thomson et al. 2017). The 
extent to which party government in Scotland deviated from the Westminster system can 
be tested by examining party responsibility at Holyrood. 
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Previous research on pledge fulfilment 
As Budge and Hofferbert state (1990, p. 113), the notion of the party mandate can “be 
refuted by showing that the program is not related to subsequent government policy”. In 
contrast to their own “saliency approach”, which tests the association between the 
emphasis parties place on issue topics and subsequent government spending, the “pledge 
approach” (Thomson 2001, p. 193), examines the direct correspondence between party 
manifesto pledges and their fulfilment by government actions. Most pledge researchers 
have reached the same conclusion: that parties tend to carry out the bulk of their election 
programmes in government (Pétry and Colette 2009). 
Early studies by Pomper (1968), Rose (1984), Rallings (1987) and Kalogeropoulou (1989), 
though less refined than subsequent research (Pétry and Colette 2009, p. 71), provided the 
first indications that political parties’ campaign pledges were redeemed more often than 
political scientists had previously assumed (see Rose 1984, p. 56). These early studies largely 
talked past one another and, crucially, each lacked a clear operational definition of what 
constitutes a “pledge” (Pétry and Colette 2009). The first concern of any study of the 
programme-to-policy linkage is how to categorise the statements made in party manifestos 
(Mansergh and Thomson 2007). The duty of the researcher is to sort “the wheat from the 
chaff” (Rose 1984, p. 62) by deciding if a given statement comprises an objective promise. 
Royed was the first researcher to discuss this at length in her 1996 study of pledge 
fulfilment in the United Kingdom and United States. 
Several pledge fulfilment case-studies followed this example, with researchers investigating 
the linkage in countries including the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Canada and Portugal (respectively Thomson 2001; Costello and Thomson 2008; 
Artés and Bustos 2008; Moury 2011; Naurin 2014; Kostadinova 2013; Praprotnik and 
Ennser-jedenastik 2015; Duval and Pétry 2018; Moury and Fernandes 2018). Efforts to share 
data and standardise coding procedures recently resulted in a comparative paper on the 
topic, the most definitive work on the programme-to-policy linkage to date (Thomson et al. 
2017). Some studies have moved beyond the linkage itself to address topics including voter 
evaluations of pledge fulfilment (Thomson 2011; Naurin and Oscarsson 2017; Pétry and 
Duval 2017; Thomson and Brandenburg 2018), other features of manifestos (Håkansson and 
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Naurin 2014; Praprotnik 2017; Dolezal et al. 2018) and methodology (Louwerse 2011; 
Naurin 2011). 
The main contribution of this literature has been to demonstrate that parties in government 
tend to follow through on most of their manifesto pledges; rarely fewer than half. 
Substantially fewer opposition party pledges are fulfilled, which is crucial from a normative 
standpoint (Thomson 2001). Government and opposition fulfilment rates vary primarily due 
to institutional and circumstantial constraints on incumbents, i.e. whether parties rule alone 
or in coalition, in majority or minority, and whether the economic conditions are favourable 
(Thomson et al. 2017). Across all cases examined by Thomson et al., the gap between 
government and opposition pledge fulfilment rates is strongest under single-party 
majorities, which carry out more than 70% of their pledges on average. Single-party 
minorities are shown to fulfil slightly fewer in aggregate. However, in many cases they have 
been shown to perform as well or better than single-party majorities (Artés 2013; Naurin 
2014). Parties participating in coalition governments, on the other hand, tend to fulfil just 
over half of their pledges (Thomson et al. 2017, p. 535). The important difference seems to 
be whether parties are forced to share power or not. 
The strongest programme-to-policy linkage in a single country is found in the United 
Kingdom, with 86% of manifesto pledges being fulfilled by governments between 1974 and 
1997 (Royed 1996; Thomson et al. 2017). In line with the findings about administration 
types, the rate tends to be slightly lower in countries where single-party minorities are 
historically common (e.g. Sweden, Portugal, Spain) and much lower in countries where 
multiparty coalitions are the norm (e.g. the Netherlands, Ireland, Austria). Expectations 
concerning the strength of the programme-to-policy linkage in Scotland are now developed 
using previous findings for reference. 
 
Expectations 
In the first three sessions of the Scottish Parliament the electoral system met its designers’ 
objectives. Two Labour-Liberal Democrat coalitions (elected in 1999and 2003) were 
followed by a Scottish National Party minority administration (elected in 2007). The 
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literature suggests that these electoral outcomes should result in lower rates of pledge 
fulfilment compared to Westminster, particularly during the coalition years. As Mansergh 
and Thomson state, “lower rates of pledge enactment can be expected in institutions that 
compel government parties to share power” (2007, p. 316). This hypothesis has received 
repeated empirical confirmation. A handful of existing pledge studies contain direct parallels 
to the Scottish case which are also relevant to this study’s expectations. These also suggest 
that the rate of pledge fulfilment at Holyrood will be lower than that at Westminster. 
So far, only a handful of English-language studies have investigated the programme-to-
policy linkage at regional level. Of greatest relevance is the evidence from Quebec (Pétry et 
al. 2018; Duval and Pétry 2019), a Canadian province which is often compared to Scotland 
due to its cultural distinctiveness and experience of unsuccessful referendums on separation 
with Canada. Pétry et al. (2018) report that the rate of fulfilment for Quebec’s provincial 
government is substantially lower than that of the Canadian government, with an average of 
52% compared to 72% at federal level (ibid., p. 5). The discrepancy is attributed to 
overlapping jurisdictions in supply and demand. Pétry et al. find that Quebec’s nationalist 
party tends to “over-pledge” by making promises which fall outwith the provincial 
jurisdiction, hence lowering its rate of fulfilment when in government. Meanwhile, Quebec 
governments already find themselves constrained by their dependence on federal resources 
and lack of control over macroeconomic decision-making. 
Another recent study reports on the linkage in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia 
(Matthieß 2019). Though Matthieß focuses on the dynamics of education-related pledge 
fulfilment for majority and minority coalition governments and does not draw a direct 
comparison with the national level, the NRW parties’ low fulfilment rates in the area—none 
even reaching 40%—also compare unfavourably to previous German federal governments 
(Ferguson 2012). 
Though we can expect to observe a similar discrepancy between the levels of government in 
a Scottish/British context, there is good reason to believe the dynamics identified by Pétry 
et al. (2018) do not directly translate to the current case. The jurisdiction of Holyrood is very 
clear, with the Scottish government exercising complete control over several areas of policy. 
Though there is more overlap between competencies now than in 1999, these changes 
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mostly happened after the time period under consideration here. This compares to 
significant overlap in functions in the case of Quebec/Canada (Pétry 2018, p. 2). In 
accordance with this, the current study adopts a research design which minimises the 
likelihood of jurisdictional overlap (and the interference of macroeconomic/fiscal factors) by 
restricting the analysis to justice and education pledges. These functions were already 
distinct in Scotland before devolution, and the Scottish government has exercised complete 
control since devolution (see the later Methods section for further discussion). Matthieß 
(2019, p. 130–31) adopted a similar approach for NRW/Germany for the same reason, 
restricting the analysis to education pledges because that issue area is “the most important 
policy field whose responsibility lies exclusively with the German states”. Though this 
decision limits the comparability of this study to the more comprehensive findings on 
Quebec, it is appropriate for the current study’s research question, which is the impact of 
“new politics” institutions on pledge fulfilment vis a vis strongly centralised Westminster 
governments. 
A second salient comparison, in terms of institutional change, is that of New Zealand’s 
adoption of a new electoral system. Public dissatisfaction with politics led to the country’s 
First Past the Post electoral system being replaced from 1996 onwards by MMP (McCluskey 
2008), the same one introduced in Scotland three years later. The result was a shift from 
majority to minority and eventually coalition government. McCluskey reported a substantial 
drop in pledge fulfilment rates, of up to twenty percentage points, following the switch in 
electoral systems. All of the available evidence suggests a significantly weaker programme-
to-policy linkage will be found in Scotland compared to Westminster. In accordance with 
these expectations, the first hypothesis is as follows. 
H1: The rate of government party pledge fulfilment in the first three sessions of the 
Scottish Parliament is closer to that of consensus democracies than the majoritarian 
Westminster system. 
It is also possible to develop expectations concerning differences between the parties. 
Though one would conventionally expect single-party minorities to be more effective than 
coalition parties, I expect that Labour obtained the highest pledge fulfilment rate of the 
three parties for a variety of contextual reasons. Labour governed at Westminster and 
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Holyrood simultaneously between 1999 and 2007, and the Scottish party retained close 
relations with the wider British party throughout. Labour were also the senior coalition 
partner on both occasions, holding 56 and then 50 seats of 127 to the Lib Dems’ 17 in each 
session. Furthermore, the two parties were closely ideologically aligned with one another, 
resulting in few dramatic disagreements. Though previous studies have not found a 
pronounced relationship between ideological proximity and pledge fulfilment (Praprotnik 
and Ennser-jedenastik 2015; Thomson et al. 2017), Labour and the Lib Dems collaborated 
especially closely in government. 
The SNP government of 2007, meanwhile, governed alone as a precarious minority. 
Comparative research on pledge fulfilment has not identified a significant difference in 
pledge fulfilment rates between single-party minority and majority administrations, though 
there is reason to believe this is partly explained by the strength of minority governments in 
the Swedish and Portuguese cases where that government type is historically common 
(Thomson et al. 2017). However, when elected in 2007 the SNP were the largest party by 
just one seat, making their plurality in parliament more tenuous than a typical minority 
government. Furthermore, they were forced to form an unlikely informal alliance with the 
Scottish Conservatives to pass legislation (Cairney 2011). The SNP’s grip on power was 
numerically delicate and required regular policy compromises, placing them in a weaker 
position to enact their promises than Labour in the preceding two terms. Hence, the second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: While in government, Scottish Labour fulfilled a greater proportion of pledges 
than its coalition partners and the SNP minority administration. 
In addition to these hypotheses, the case presents an opportunity to test the received 
wisdom of the wider literature within a different institutional context and a “new” sub-
national political system. Supplementary analysis enables further expectations to be tested 
using the subset of pledges made by the coalition parties. Previous studies have identified 
several factors which contribute to pledge fulfilment, most concerning the impact of 
institutional and circumstantial limitations on governing parties’ freedom to act. In addition 
to the repeated finding that the type of government matters for pledge fulfilment 
(especially single- vs. multiparty), researchers have investigated the impact of coalition-
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specific constraints on power such as control of the chief executive, control of the relevant 
ministry, and the presence/absence of pledges in coalition partnership agreements 
(Thomson 2001; Costello and Thomson 2008). 
Given the importance of institutional control, previous studies have investigated the impact 
of possession of the relevant ministry on the likelihood a pledge will be redeemed. If a party 
controls the portfolio, the minister should theoretically wield enough influence to prioritise 
their own party’s pledges. Though Thomson (2001) initially found that ministerial 
appointments made a difference to pledge fulfilment in the Netherlands, subsequent 
comparative research has not (Thomson et al. 2017). As such, the third hypothesis is as 
follows: 
H3: Party control of the relevant cabinet post does not increase the likelihood that a 
pledge will be fulfilled. 
In addition to the function of communicating with voters, manifestos are also used by 
parties to signal to one another in advance of possible government formation negotiations 
(Harmel 2018). These negotiations in turn tend to revolve around the manifestos, with 
pledges sometimes used as bargaining chips (alongside ministerial portfolios). Following 
successful negotiations, coalition partners typically produce a joint statement or programme 
outlining their shared priorities; these documents are known as coalition or partnership 
agreements, and the format is reminiscent of manifesto documents. During coalition 
negotiations, campaign pledges are often used as “bargaining chips”. Coalition partnership 
agreements were published by both of the Scottish Labour-Liberal Democrat governments 
following their negotiations (Scottish Executive 1999, 2003). Previous studies have found 
that pledges contained in coalition agreements are much more likely to be fulfilled than 
those which aren’t (Mansergh and Thomson 2007; Praprotnik and Ennser-Jedenastik 2015). 
As such, the final hypothesis is as follows: 
H4: Pledges included in the partnership agreements were significantly more likely to 
be fulfilled. 
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Method 
The first stage of the analysis was to identify pledge statements in the five party manifestos. 
Pledges necessarily contain a “phrase indicating support” attached to a substantive policy 
commitment, while purely rhetorical statements and “value judgements” are not 
considered pledges (Royed 1996, pp. 79, 80). The support clause typically comprises firm 
commitments like “we will” as well as looser ones such as “we favour” (Mansergh and 
Thomson 2007). Meanwhile, researchers have held that the policy clause of a statement 
must be “testable” for it to count as a pledge (Royed 1996; Mansergh and Thomson 2007; 
Thomson et al. 2017). This article draws heavily from the operational definition of a pledge 
agreed by leading researchers in the field: “a statement committing a party to one specific 
action or outcome that can be clearly determined to have occurred or not” (Thomson et al. 
2017, p. 552). However, I specify one slight difference. Under this criterion, statements 
which do not include an explicit target or course of action are not counted as pledges. It is 
possible to argue, however, that an untestable pledge is still a pledge if it is framed that way 
by the manifesto authors. Citizens can have a reasonable expectation of action to achieve a 
given policy objective, even if the particular criteria are not specified. As such these 
statements can be considered to constitute “vague” pledges, but pledges nonetheless. 
It is possible to expand the operational definition in this way because pledges in this study 
are coded according to level of specificity using a modified scheme based on the categories 
devised by Bara (2005): vague, general, specific and detailed. Those in the vague category 
have a commitment clause, but the policy clause lacks an objectively verifiable action or 
outcome. General pledges are those with a statement of intent plus either a measurable 
outcome target or a course of action specified. Pledges coded as specific contain both an 
observable action and measureable outcome. Specific pledges with embellished rationales 
and fulfilment criteria are coded as detailed. The minor operational difference with 
Thomson et al. (2017) has no impact on the findings, since I exclude vague pledges from the 
analysis in any case. Theoretically, general, specific and detailed pledges fit those authors’ 
operational definition of a pledge. Pledge fulfilment must also be operationalised. The 
criteria for pledge fulfilment are “in principle provided by the writers of election 
programmes, not the researcher” (Thomson 2001, p. 180). In other words, the terms of the 
pledge define what constitutes fulfilment. Fulfilment therefore can be construed as the 
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attainment of an outcome or an action taken by the government, achieved in the relevant 
parliamentary session, which meets the provisions of the pledge. 
In accordance with the previous literature, Scottish parties’ pledges are coded as either not 
fulfilled, partly fulfilled or fully fulfilled. Partial fulfilment in the case of action means that 
some substantive, observable steps were taken by the government in the direction intended 
but that this was not sufficient to meet the terms provided by the party in their manifesto. 
Outcome fulfilment is assessed in a similar way, with numerical targets considered partly 
fulfilled if they amounted to at least 30% of the total pledged and fully fulfilled at 75%. As 
noted above, the analysis does not include all pledges, but is limited to the policy areas of 
education and justice. This decision was taken for practical and substantive reasons. Pledge 
studies are time-consuming, and restricting the analysis to a representative subset of policy 
areas speeds up the process. This approach has been taken in some previous national-level 
pledge studies, which focused exclusively on socioeconomic pledges (Thomson 2001; Artés 
2013). Given the limited socioeconomic powers devolved to Holyrood, however, this is not 
an appropriate option here. 
Justice and education, meanwhile, are highly salient policy areas in which the Scottish 
government exercises complete autonomy. These issue areas avoid jurisdictional overlap 
with Westminster and, crucially, the Scottish government is not likely to gain (or lose) 
powers on these matters. Since devolution, powers in other issue areas have flowed north 
of the border, which would render over-time comparisons between Scottish governments 
problematic. The powers of the devolved legislature on justice and education are a 
constant, not only between 1999 and 2011, but up to the present day and beyond. The 
choice to limit the collection of data to these policy areas could theoretically bias the 
findings, as parties might prioritise the issues differently or find it more challenging to enact 
pledges in one or the other. However, given the close ideological proximity of the three 
parties in this analysis and the high salience of the issues in question, there is no reason to 
believe there is undue cause for concern. Additionally, as stated above, this approach has 
also been adopted by Matthieß (2019) for the purposes of a regional-level pledge study. 
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Pledge fulfilment in Scotland during coalition and minority government 
600 justice and education pledges were identified across the five manifestos. 229 of these 
were coded vague and excluded from analysis, with the remaining 371 checked for 
fulfilment. The rate of pledge fulfilment for each party in the combined policy domains of 
education and justice is shown in Table 1. The percentage data is visualised in Fig. 1. Table 2 
shows Scottish government pledge fulfilment in a comparative context using information 
from a selection of previous pledge studies. These findings align with the general takeaway 
from previous studies, which is that election-winning political parties make progress 
enacting most of their testable manifesto pledges. In aggregate, the parties which entered 
government in the first three sessions of the Scottish parliament carried out half of their 
election pledges, with some progress made on roughly another quarter. 
Table 1. Scottish manifesto pledge fulfilment 
Party and election year Not fulfilled Partly fulfilled Fully fulfilled Total 
Labour 1999 17.0% (9) 22.6% (12) 60.4% (32) 100% (53) 
Lib Dem 1999 36.4% (16) 22.7% (10) 40.9% (18) 100% (44) 
Labour 2003 14.6% (13) 18.0% (16) 67.4% (60) 100% (90) 
Lib Dem 2003 22.6% (21) 32.3% (30) 45.2% (42) 100% (93) 
SNP 2007 29.3% (27) 30.4% (28) 40.2% (37) 100% (92) 
Total 23.2% (86) 25.9% (96) 50.9% (189) 100% (371) 
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Table 2. Comparative government pledge fulfilment rate 
Country/Region Aggregate fulfilment rate Govt. type 
United Kingdom, 1974-1997 86% Majority 
Sweden, 1994-2014 79% Minority/Coalition 
New Zealand, 1972-1996 78% Majority 
Portugal, 1995-1999 & 2005-2009 78% Majority/Minority 
Scotland, 1999-2011 77% Coalition/Minority 
Spain, 1989-2004 72% Majority/Minority 
Canada, 1993-2015 68% Majority/Minority 
Germany, 2002-2013 63% Coalition 
New Zealand, 1996-2005* 62% Minority 
United States, 1976-2000 62% Mixed 
Quebec, 1994-2014 60% Mixed 
The Netherlands, 1986-1998 57% Coalition 
Ireland, 1977-2016 52% Coalition 
Bulgaria, 1995-2013 51% Coalition/Mixed 
Austria, 2000-2013 50% Coalition 
Italy, 1996-2011 46% Coalition 
 
Note: Table adapted from Thomson et al. (2017, p. 535). New Zealand figures taken from McCluskey (2008, p. 
443). Quebec figures taken from Pétry et al. (2018, p. 4)  
 
Turning to the study’s expectations, H1 receives little support. The level of fulfilment 
attained by Scottish governing parties is more in line with that observed in majoritarian 
systems than consensus democracies. Table 2 shows the findings in a comparative context 
using information from a selection of previous pledge studies. Note that countries’ 
aggregate pledge fulfilment rates are shown rather than average government fulfilment 
rates, though this makes little difference in most cases. The table demonstrates a clear 
trend towards higher fulfilment in countries where single-party governments are common, 
which Scotland upsets slightly. The aggregate Scottish pledge fulfilment rate is more 
comparable to the one observed by McCluskey before New Zealand’s change in electoral 
system, after which there was a substantial drop. This chimes with Lundberg’s comparison 
of the two countries. He argues that the relationship of Holyrood to Westminster and the 
constitutional question more generally creates a “centre-periphery cleavage” (2013, p. 6) 
which has led to less deviation from the Westminster model than observed in New Zealand. 
Additionally, though the aggregate rates in Table 2 are in line with one another, the average 
Scottish pledge fulfilment rate (75%) compares more favourably to the UK one than does 
Quebec to Canada. However, this could be a function of the limited number of issue areas 
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used in the present analysis. It might be the case that, in areas with greater jurisdictional 
overlap than justice and education, Scottish governments fulfil fewer pledges. Nonetheless, 
it is at least possible to state that, in the areas which Scotland’s devolved institutions 
exercise the greatest authority, the programme-to-policy linkage at Holyrood is of a similar 
strength to the one observed at Westminster. 
The notion that Holyrood politics did not initially stray far from Westminster norms is one 
shared by other researchers. Early assessments showed that MSPs and their parties did not 
behave much differently to their counterparts at Westminster (Cowley and Lochore 2000). 
As Cairney states (2011, p. 39), the first two sessions of the Scottish Parliament were 
characterised by a style of government “that would not seem out of place in the UK”. This 
claim receives further support here, as shown in Table 1 and Fig. 1. The Labour party 
attained the highest rates of pledge fulfilment by partly or entirely redeeming 83% of their 
1999 pledges and 85% of their 2003 pledges. The equivalent figures for the Liberal 
Democrats are 64% and 76%, while the SNP made progress on 71% of their 2007 pledges as 
a minority administration. 
These figures confirm H2. As expected, although Labour could not govern with the single-
party majority the party was accustomed to at UK level, they did not behave as if they were 
constrained by coalition politics. Additionally, the Liberal Democrats fulfilled an unusually 
high proportion of pledges for a junior coalition partner. They substantially increased their 
pledge fulfilment rate in the second session, despite doubling the number of pledges made 
in 2003 compared to 1999. Labour also increased the number of pledges made and 
marginally improved the fulfilment rate in the second session. This is consistent with a 
previously reported tendency for parties to redeem increasing numbers of pledges with 
successive terms in office (McCluskey 2008, p. 428), and for the number of pledges made to 
increase over time (Håkansson and Naurin 2014). Additionally, this supports Cairney’s 
(2011) contention that the second session saw greater executive dominance. It seems that 
Labour were able to apply experience at one level of government to another, while the 
inexperienced Lib Dems quickly learned how to improve their effectiveness at turning 
promises into policy. 
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The role of the government partnership agreement in the formation of the successive 
coalitions supports these inferences about governing experience. Official documents 
outlining the joint Labour-Lib Dem programme for government were released at the 
beginning of each session. Table 3 shows how many manifesto pledges made it into the 
relevant agreement. The first partnership agreement, “Making it Work Together”, included 
only 43% of Labour pledges and 25% of Lib Dem pledges. The second agreement 4 years 
later, however, included 76% of Labour pledges and 63% of Lib Dem pledges, despite 
substantial increases in the total number of pledges made by each party. This accords with 
Arter’s contention (2004) that the Lib Dems were more satisfied with second coalition 
bargaining process because the agreement paved the way for greater power sharing within 
the executive. One Lib Dem negotiator even described the 2003 negotiation as a matter of 
“merging the two manifestos” (Arter 2004, p. 23). This may have been facilitated by the 
senior party’s slightly weaker parliamentary position. 
Table 3. Pledges in coalition partnership agreements 
Manifesto Not included % (n) Included % (n) Total % (n) 
Labour 1999 57.3 (43) 42.7 (32) 100 (75) 
Lib Dem 1999 75.9 (63) 24.1 (20) 100 (83) 
Labour 2003 23.9 (33) 76.1 (105) 100 (138) 
Lib Dem 2003 36.7 (61) 63.3 (105) 100 (166) 
 
The first 8 years of the devolved Scottish experience, then, were characterised by the 
continuity of Westminster norms under an unusually unified coalition government. Did this 
change under a more precarious minority administration? The SNP emerged from the close-
run 2007 election as the largest party by a single seat, winning 47 to Labour’s 46. At 
loggerheads with Labour and unable to achieve a parliamentary majority in partnership with 
any other individual party, the SNP decided to go it alone, bringing about the potential for 
parliamentary negotiation the SCC had envisioned for the first time. This was something 
that SNP leader and new First Minister Alex Salmond explicitly acknowledged (Mitchell 
2010, p. 112). Although the government occasionally found itself constrained by the 
parliamentary arithmetic, the reduced-size cabinet operated with a kind of stability that had 
evaded the coalition (Cairney 2011). The administration also worked around parliament by 
using policymaking tools other than primary legislation, such as Scottish Statutory 
Instruments. And despite having ample opportunity, parliament “did not fill the legislative 
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gap” (Cairney 2011, p. 51), with the executive producing the lion’s share of bills and 
amendments. By the end of the third session, the SNP had passed nearly as much legislation 
as either of the coalition administrations, and the number of withdrawn or defeated bills 
compared favourably (Lundberg 2013). When the government did need legislative help they 
turned to the Conservatives for informal support, with the two parties voting together three 
quarters of the time (Cairney 2011, p. 53). 
The overall impression given, then, is not one of a party paralysed by its position. It is not 
the case, as Cairney implies (2011, p. 51), that the administration was unable to meet many 
of its manifesto commitments. Indeed, the SNP government’s enthusiastic pursuit of a 
controversial decentralisation agenda through a deal with the Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities (COSLA) may have impeded its progress on other campaign promises as councils 
failed to deliver on marquee outcome promises made in the party’s manifesto. The 
commitment to reduce primary school class sizes is one such example. Unlike the coalition 
parties’ pledge fulfilment rates, however, the performance of Scotland’s 2007–2011 
minority government is not unusual. As noted above, parties governing alone tend to fulfil a 
healthy majority of pledges regardless of their minority or majority status, and multivariate 
comparative analysis failed to identify a significant difference between majority and 
minority single-party governments (Thomson et al. 2017). 
Though the SNP’s single-seat majority and inability to formally partner with other Holyrood 
parties likely impeded their ability to carry out some manifesto pledges, the unexpectedly 
high rate of pledge fulfilment in Scotland is primarily a result of the Westminster-style 
governance of the successive coalition administrations, especially the Labour party. This 
suggests that, despite the intentions of the designers, the Scottish political system inherited 
the adversarial, majoritarian political norms of Westminster. The following analysis of 
coalition pledge fulfilment under coalition government below bolsters this impression. 
 
Explaining coalition pledge fulfilment 
Here I present a logistic regression analysis of pledge fulfilment under Scotland’s coalition 
governments. Like other explanatory analyses of pledge fulfilment, the dependent variable 
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in the model is a pledge fulfilment dummy (not fulfilled = 0, partly/fully fulfilled = 1). 
Compared to previous studies, however, the model is limited by the nature of the case. The 
SNP government’s pledges are excluded for methodological reasons, since typically 
important explanatory variables like government type, party and session are entirely 
colinear for these observations. This leaves 278 observations of “testable” pledges made by 
Labour and the Lib Dems. Various explanatory variables typical of pledge fulfilment analyses 
are also necessarily excluded here due to a lack of variation or unsuitability, including as 
economic growth, government type, seat share and cabinet duration (Thomson et al. 2017). 
These constraints can be considered advantageous, however, because they allow the 
analysis to focus on a handful of explanatory factors while others are unavoidably held 
constant. 
Party ownership of the relevant ministry (portfolio not held = 0, portfolio held = 1) and the 
presence of each pledge in the relevant coalition agreement (not in agreement = 0, in 
agreement = 1) are the explanatory variables used to test H3 and H4. The session of the 
Scottish parliament (first = 0, second = 1), party (Lib Dem = 0, Labour = 1) and policy area 
(justice = 0, education = 1) are included as controls to account for the trends identified in the 
descriptive analysis. A “detailed pledge” dummy created using the specificity categories 
outlined above is also included for exploratory purposes. Because relatively few detailed 
pledges were identified, specific and detailed pledges have been aggregated (general = 0, 
specific/detailed = 1). 
The results are shown in Table 4. Party control of the relevant ministry to the pledge’s policy 
area is found to have no effect on pledge fulfilment. The coefficient is negative and 
relatively large but not close to significance, confirming H3. Though the constraints of the 
chosen case mean this alone would not be generalisable, it is consistent with the very weak 
or non-existent effects identified in previous research (Thomson et al. 2017). It also suggests 
that the Lib Dems’ indifference to portfolio allocations was the correct attitude from a 
policy-seeking perspective (Roddin 2004). 
Table 4. Predicting coalition pledge fulfilment (logistic regression) 
 Coefficient P-value 
Detailed -0.840** .035 
Education 0.054 .880 
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Ministry  -0.602 .161 
Partnership 1.393*** .000 
Session 2 0.136 .717 
Labour 0.875** .024 
Constant 0.583 .134 
Observations  287 
Log likelihood  -128.442 
The findings concerning the partnership agreement confirm H4. Pledges which made their 
way into the agreement were much more likely to be fulfilled than those which didn’t, and it 
is by far the strongest predictor of fulfilment in the model with a large and strongly 
significant coefficient. Given the ideological overlap between the Lib Dem and Labour 
programmes in 1999 and 2003, it is unsurprising that this carried through into fulfilment. 
This is reflected in the increased proportion of both parties’ manifesto pledges which were 
included in the second agreement and reinforces the descriptive findings. With regard to 
the control variables, the session variable is not found to be significant. This is surprising 
given the substantially increased rate of Lib Dem pledge fulfilment. However, the 
independent effect of governing experience may be absorbed by the massive increase in 
pledges entering the coalition agreement in 2003. The effects of governing experience and 
the coalition agreement are difficult to causally separate from one another in this case. 
Though the parties did not run as a formal “pre-election coalition”, they did anticipate a 
similar result and outcome to 1999. 
Table 4 also demonstrates that the policy area is irrelevant to the fulfilment of pledges in 
this study. Being based on just two policy areas, however, this finding should not be 
generalised. The party control is moderately significant, with Labour pledges remaining 
much more likely to be fulfilled when other factors are accounted for. This reinforces the 
conclusions of the descriptive analysis. Finally, a suggestive novel result has been identified 
regarding pledge detail, which has not previously been tested in the literature. More 
detailed pledges are significantly less likely to be fulfilled. When parties set more stringent 
fulfilment criteria for their pledges, they find them more challenging to redeem. There is 
scope to replicate this finding and identify interaction effects in other settings, possibly 
using these coding procedures with existing data where the original pledge text is available. 
The effect may be weaker under conditions with fewer institutional constraints on 
government action. 
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Conclusion 
The analysis presented here demonstrates that Scottish governing parties enact their 
manifesto commitments at a rate comparable to their UK counterparts. The Labour party 
especially appears to have successfully resisted the ambitions of the Scottish system’s 
designers and governed much like its “big brother” at Westminster. As Cairney observes, 
“the first 8 years of devolution proved that new powers and institutions were not effective 
on their own” (2011, p. 41). The Lib Dems and SNP also achieved high overall rates of pledge 
fulfilment, though these are more in line with what would be expected based on existing 
comparative evidence. 
The findings here come with the caveat that only justice and education pledges are included 
in the analysis. Though it is wise to be cautious in making generalisations for this reason, 
there is little difference in fulfilment between the two policy areas, and the patterns of 
pledge fulfilment identified align well with existing research. As such, it is possible to state 
with some confidence that the experience of devolved Scottish government until at least 
2011 was of responsible parties carrying out perceived mandates to enact their campaign 
promises. Contrary to the hopes of the SCC and CSG, institutions alone were not enough to 
distance the incipient Scottish party system from the Westminster culture of strong party 
responsibility. This conclusion is in line with the existing academic consensus that Scottish 
politics did not develop a distinctive, consensual executive and legislative culture following 
devolution, but instead continued in the mould of Westminster (see Mitchell 2000; Arter 
2004). This article also represents one of the few attempts to study the programme-to-
policy linkage at sub-national level. The main finding suggests that political culture can 
override institutional arrangements and electoral outcomes which would typically weaken 
the programme-to-policy linkage. However, the underlying patterns of pledge fulfilment and 
the results of the supplementary analysis align well with the existing literature. 
I propose several next steps for further research. The most obvious is to examine the record 
of the 2011 SNP majority government. Did the SNP behave like a Westminster majority, or 
did the independence referendum take up all the policy bandwidth? This question deserves 
its own in-depth treatment. The manifestos of opposition parties could also be tested, with 
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the Scottish Conservatives’ record from 2007 to 2011 of particular interest given their close 
informal collaboration with the SNP. Finally, for the field of research more generally, it may 
be useful to develop a consistent measure of pledge “specificity”, either using qualitative 
coding procedures, a machine learning approach using a training dataset or a reliable proxy 
(e.g. length). This would help scholars achieve a better understanding of the meaning of the 
programme-to-policy linkage in a comparative context. 
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